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A  question  now  being  asked  in  many  states  is  PROCEDURES
whether  the  property  tax  is  too  burdensome  and  A  crossclassification  of  sample  taxpayers  by
whether  it should  be  displaced by another tax. Many  income  group  and rural-urban  residence  is presented
states have  lowered property taxes  on specific classes  for  both property and  income taxes, thus allowing  a
of property,  while  other  states  are  considering  more  close  examination  of  relationships  between  (1)  tax
widespread  relief  from  property  taxes.  If  property  liability  and  income  and  (2)  tax  liability  and
taxes  are  reduced,  other  taxes  will  have  to  be  residence.  The  level of taxes paid is then converted to
increased  in order  to offset reductions in government  taxes paid  per dollar of income to determine whether
revenues.  What  is  the  effect  of substituting  one tax  t  is rgressive  or progressive.
for  another; who  will pay more and who will pay less  The  information  on  tax burdens  can  be used  to
if  property  taxes  are  decreased  and  sales  or  income  examine  alternative  tax  polices.  Tax  rate  changes,
taxes  increased?  Will overall regressiveness  of taxes be  which  are  examined  in this study, allow  for increases
reduced  by  substitution?  The  basic  technique  of  in  state  or  local  sales  and  income  taxes  to  exactly
sampling  and  analysis  presented  here  hopefully  will  offset  reductions  in  government  revenues  resulting
be  applicable  in  many  states  and  will  provide  from  a  decrease  in  property  taxes.  The  net  dollar
important answers to these questions.  value of trade-offs resulting  from increase  in one tax
rate  versus  decrease  in  another  is  estimated  on a  per
OBJECTIVES  capita  basis according  to level of income earned. Also,
The  major  objectives  of this  study  were  (1)  to  the  extent  to  which  a  tradeoff  policy  might  be
define  and describe  regressiveness and progressiveness  carried  is  explored by showing  how  regressiveness  of
of  Georgia  sales,  property, and income taxes for rural  the  overall  tax structure is affected in rural and urban
and  urban  homeowners,  and  (2)  to  demonstrate  counties by a given policy.
changes  in regressiveness  and  changes  in shares of tax
burden  when  the  same total tax revenue  is  collected
by  various  combinations  of  sales,  state  income, and
property taxes.  Income, Sales  and Property Tax Liabilities
The  cross-classification  of  sample  taxpayers  by
~~~~DATA  ~income  group  and  by  level  of  property  taxes  due
Cross-classification  and  description  of property  exhibited  a  slight  positive  relationship  between
and  state  income  taxes  were  made  possible  by  a  income  and  taxes  (Table  1).  An  exception  to  this
random  sample  of  homeowners  from  each  Georgia  positive  relationship  for  all  taxpayers  occurs  in  the
county. Data  from paired  state income  and property  lowest  income  group  for which the average  property
tax  returns  were  the  basis  for  estimating  tax  was relatively  high compared to other low income
regressiveness  or  progressiveness  of  taxes.  Sales tax  groups.
liability  was  estimated  from  tables  supplied  to  Property tax liabilities were lower on the average
taxpayers  by the Internal Revenue Service  [8].  in  rural  counties  ($95.50)  than  in  urban  counties
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109Table  1.  DISTRIBUTIONS  OF PROPERTY, INCOME,  AND SALES TAXES,  GEORGIA,  1971
Property  Tax
Adjusted  County  Population
Gross  Income  Less  Than  10,000  10,000  or  More  Average  Income  Tax  Sales  Taxa
---------------------------------------- (dollars)---
0-2,000  65.71  136.27  105.51  1.38  47.96
2,000-4,000  71.93  62.00  66.60  3.07  64.53
4,000-6,000  67.65  71.78  69.45  11.76  93.99
6,000-8,000  68.89  82.89  77.56  32.65  108.71
8,000-10,000  72.75  110.51  98.06  66.19  127.85
10,000-12,000  80.04  125.07  111.19  110.23  149.14
12,000-14,000  119.52  137.24  132.77  163.57  164.82
14,000-16,000  226.85  201.47  207.36  237.70  175.32
16,000-18,000  165.82  182.62  178.00  287.70  193.47
Over  18,000  275.22  360.44  331.62  883.51  287.12
Average  95.50  131.97  118.66  134.36  134.41
aAverage  exemption  per income  class  ranged from 2.8 to 3.9. Thus, all  sales tax estimates were based
on 3  to 4 exemptions.
($131.97).'  In  fact, rural property tax liabilities were  income,  and  continued  to  decline  through  the
lower  in  almost  every  income  class,  and  rural  areas  $10,000-$12,000  adjusted  gross  income  category.
did not exhibit the very large property tax liability of  This  fact  suggests  that  the  property tax  is regressive
the lowest  income class found in urban  areas.  (Table  2).2  In general,  regressiveness  of property tax
Average  state  income  tax liability  for the sample  was  exhibited  throughout  most  of  the  range  of
was  $134.36 (Table  1), ranging from  $1  for taxpayers  observed data.
in the lowest  income  group to  $884 for those in the  The  property  tax was regressive in both rural and
highest  income  group.  State  income  and  sales  tax  urban  areas,  with  the lowest  property tax  per dollar.
liabilities  for  a  given  income  class  were  very  similar  of  income  occurring  in  the  $8,000-$12,000  income
for rural  and urban  residents  since  they were  subject  group  in  rural  areas,  but in higher  income  groups in
to the same tax rates.  urban  areas.  Average  property  tax  per  thousand
The  average  sales tax  per taxpayer  was  $134.41,  dollars of income in  urban areas  is  13  percent higher
which  was  similar  to  the  average  property  tax  in  than in rural areas.
urban  counties,  but  41  percent  higher  than  the  Sales  Tax.  Since  the  average  number  of
average  property  tax  in rural  counties. The  sales  tax  exemptions  for  property-wning  taxpayers  in  the
exceeded  the  property  tax in most of the low income  sample was  3.4, estimation  of sales tax payments was
classes (Table  1).  based on allowable  sales tax deductions for three-four
Empirical Estimates of Tax Rate  exemptions.  Allowable  sales  tax  per  $1,000  of
adjusted  gross income  was very similar to the amount Property  Tax.  Sample  data  demonstrated  that of  property  tax  collected  and  was  regressive  to  a
property,  sales,  and  income  tax  liabilities  increased  . r 
similar  extent.  However,  the  level  of sales  tax was
with adjusted  gross income.  However,  property taxes  ^  ^  'i.  i  lower in the $0-2,000  category (Table 2). per  dollar  of  income  were  highest  for  sample
taxpayers  having  less  than  $2,000  adjusted  gross  Income Tax.  Income  tax  collected from  sample
1The  62  Georgia  counties  with  less  than  10,000  population  were  referred  to  as  rural counties,  while  the other  97
Georgia  counties  were referred to as urban counties.
2Adjusted  gross  income  may  understate total income  of taxpayers in the lowest  income  groups, because  it ignores such
transfer payments  as  retirement and welfare  payments.
110Table  2.  AVERAGE  PROPERTY  TAX,  INCOME  TAX,  AND  SALES  TAX  PER $1,000  OF  ADJUSTED
GROSS  INCOME BY SIZE OF COUNTY POPULATION,  TAXPAYERS  IN GEORGIA,  1971
Property  Tax
Adjusted  County  Population
Gross  Income  Less  Than  10,000  10,000  or  More  Average  Income  Tax  Sales  Tax  Total  Tax
(dollars)  ------------------------------ (dollars  per thousand) -------------------------------
0-2,000  59.94  103.68  86.54  1.14  39.33  127.02
2,000-4,000  22.51  20.09  21.23  0.98  20.57  42.78
4,000-6,000  13.56  14.48  13.96  2.36  18.89  35.21
6,000-8,000  9.91  11.75  11.05  4.65  15.48  31.18
8,000-10,000  7.94  12.25  10.82  7.30  14.10  32.22
10,000-12,000  7.38  11.37  10.15  10.05  13.62  33.82
12,000-14,000  9.16  10.62  10.25  12.63  12.72  35.60
14,000-16,000  15.07  13.43  13.81  15.75  11.68  41.24
16,000-18,000  10.03  10.82  10.60  17.14  11.39  39.13
Over  18,000  10.71  12.05  11.64  31.02  10.08  52.74
Average  13.87  15.68  15.09  8.83  15.54  39.45
respondents  also  was  summarized,  and  was  enough  to  offset  the  reduction  in  tax  revenue.  One
progressively  higher throughout  most of the range of  simple  way to introduce  an income tax substitute for
observed  incomes (Table  2). Very  little state income  property taxes would be to require a given percentage
tax  was  paid  on  adjusted  gross  income  of  less  than  increase  in  state  or  local  income  tax  liability  to be
$6,000,  where  property  taxes were  found to be the  added  as  a  surcharge  while  decreasing  property  tax
most  regressive.  The  amount  of income tax paid per  liability.  For  example,  if each  taxpayer in the sample
$1,000  of  adjusted  gross  income  increased  at  an  paid  only  50  percent  of his  property  tax  due,  how
almost  constant rate.  much  would  each  person  increase  his  income  tax
Total  Tax. When  all  three  taxes  were  combined,  liability  so  that the  total of all  taxes collected would Total Tax. When  all  three  taxes were  combined,
the  progressiveness  of  the  income  tax  added  some  not  change?
balance  to the  regressive  effect  of property and sales  If all  property  taxes in the  sample were  reduced
taxes  in  all  but  the  lowest  income  category.  A  1 percent,  an  increase  in  all  income  taxes  of  .883
comparison  of  the  three  taxes  for  the  average  percent  would  just  offset  the  reduction  in  tax
taxpayer  also  revealed  similarity in  tax payments per  collections  (Table  1).  Even though there would be no
thousand  dollars of adjusted gross  income  (Table  2).  change  in total  taxes collected, there would be a shift
in the  amount of taxes that taxpayers in each income
TRADE-OFF ANALYSIS  class  would  pay.  Since the property tax is regressive
and  the  income  tax  is  progressive,  there would  be a
Substitution  of  one  tax  for  another  can  be  shift  in  the  tax  burden  from  taxpayers  with  low
identified  in  terms  of  trade-off  values,  which  are  income levels to taxpayers with high income levels.
defined  as  the  cost  or benefit to the  taxpayer when
this substitution takes place. Possible  new tax changes  Property Tax and Sales Tax Trade-Off
considered  in  this  paper  are  those  in  which  tax
liabilities  for  a particular  tax  would  be  changed  by  A  similar  trade-off  analysis  was  made  to
the  same  percentage  for  each  taxpayer.  The  determine  how  a  decrease in  property taxes could be
distribution  of tax  revenue to local uses was assumed  offset  by  an  increase  in  state  or  local  sales  taxes.
to  be  unaffected  by  changing  the  tax  collection  Since  average  property tax  per homeowner  was 88.3
policy.  percent  of  his  average  sales  tax,  every  1 percent
decrease  in  property  taxes  must be accompanied  by
Property Tax and Income Tax Trade-Off  an 0.883  percent  increase  in sales tax to maintain the
In  the  first  trade-off  analysis,  property  taxes  current level of tax collections.
were  reduced  and  income  taxes  were  increased  While  the  average  percentage  increases  required
111of  sales  and  income  tax  rates  to  offset  decreased  Tax  liability  changes  are  then  weighted  by  the
property  tax  rates  are  coincidentally  the  same,  the  estimated  percentage  of  taxpayers  within  the
change  in  taxes  paid  by  income  class  is  very  specified  income  classes.  Thus,  the weighted  average
dissimilar.  Because  both property  and sales taxes  are  index is given by:
regressive,  an  increase  in  sales  taxes  and  a
simultaneous  and  offsetting  decrease  in  property 
taxes  would  not  shift  the  tax burden  from  low  to  Index of Tax Equity=  wiC
high income  earners.  Taxpayers  in  both low-income  i=
and  high-income  categories  would  pay  less,  while
taxpayers  in  middle-income  categories  would  pay  where wi is  the weight  of the  ith tax liability change
more.  based  on the  number  of taxpayers  in income classes i
EFFECT OF PROPERTY AND INCOME TAX  and i+l, and
TRADE-OFF  ON EQUITY  9
23  wi=l. Simple  trade-off  analysis  was  extended  to show  i =  1
distribution  of benefits  and  costs by class  of income
earner.  In  general,  increasing  state  or  local  income  If the  value of the index for a particular tax structure
taxes  and  reducing  property  taxes  by  an  equal  is  negative,  then  the  tax  structure  is  regressive;  if
amount  shifts  the  tax  burden  from  low-income  to  positive, the tax structure  is progressive.4
high-income  earners.  Does this policy promote equity  In applying the  index  to the sample  data for the
and,  if  so,  how  far  should  the policy be taken,  if at  state,  we  find  that the  Index of Tax Equity is  -2.99
all?  While  this  question  must  be  answered  in  the  for  the property tax; -1.29 for the sales tax, and  1.12
political  process,  there  is  an  additional  analysis  for  the  income  tax.  Since  these  tax liabilities  can  be
related  to tax equity  that may be of some interest to  combined  to estimate  total tax liability, these indices
voters.  If  a progressive  tax structure  is thought  to be  are  additive.  Thus,  the  Index  of Tax Equity for  the
more  equitable  than  a  regressive  structure,  then  it  overall  structure  of  taxes  is  -3.16,  indicating  a
should be possible  to relate changes in tax policy to a  regressive current tax structure.
measure of regressiveness or progressiveness.  When  the  Index  is  applied  to  counties  having
An  observed  tax structure  might be regressive  for  greater  than  10,000  population,  the  total  tax
taxpayers  at  some  income  levels  and progressive  for  structure  has  a  regressive  value  of -3.36.  The  total
others  at  a  different  level.  An  overall  measure  of  structure  is  less  regressive  in  smaller  rural  counties
regressiveness  or  progressiveness  can be calculated  as  where  the  Index  is  -2.88.  The  difference  in  Index
the  weighted  average  of changing  tax liabilities  over  values between  rural and urban  areas  is,  in general,  a
all  income  levels.3 Thus,  we  define  tax  liability  function  of property  tax burden.  Sales  and  income
change  (C)  as  change  in  tax  liability  divided  by  Indices  were  essentially  the  same  in  all  areas, but the
change in income or:  property  tax  Index  is -3.20 in the larger counties and
TLi+ - TLi only -2.73 in rural counties.
Ci =  Two  factors  contribute  to this difference.  First,
Ii+1  - Ii  the  most  regressive  part  of  the property  tax burden
falls  on  income  earners  in  the  $0-2,000  class  who
where  reside  in  urban  areas.  Second,  the  regressiveness  of
C is tax liability change,  the  property  tax extends  to  a higher  income  level in
urban  areas and therefore  covers  more of the median
i  specifies  the  income  class (for example,  if  income  classes.  These  factors  are  delineated when  we
i=l, then the income class is  $02,000),  project  trade-off polices that  would  change  the total
TL  is  average  tax  liability  per  thousand  tax structure from regressive to progressive, or to find
dollars of income, and  the  point  at which  the  Index of Tax Equity changes
I  is  average  adjusted  gross  income  in  from negative to positive.
thousand dollars.  A  state-wide  Index  value  was  calculated  for
3Such an  average  implies  constant  utility  of money.  The consequences  of declining  utility of money  merely imply  that
the index  is a  conservative  estimate  of change  in regressiveness.
4While  the index  correctly  identifies the  degree  of  regressiveness  or progressiveness,  it does not reflect  the distribution
of  regressiveness  or  progressiveness  within  the  tax  structure.  To  reflect  distribution  as  well,  the  index  can  be  used  with
concentration ratios as discussed  by  Musgrave  [3].
112various  trade-offs between property  and income  tax,  class  in  urban  areas.  This  was  almost  twice  the gain
with sales  taxes  remaining  constant.  Each  1 percent  that  would  be  received  by  taxpayers  in  any  other
reduction  in  property  taxes  was accompanied  by an  group, rural or urban (Table  3). The trade-off analysis
0.883  percent  increase  in  income  taxes.  Using  this  also  showed  that  benefits  extended  through  the
trade-off procedure, property taxes would be reduced  $12,000 income  class in urban areas and only through
80  percent  and  income taxes  increased 70.6  percent  the  $10,000  class in rural areas (Table 3). There was a
in  order  to  make  the  overall  Index  approximately  small  net  benefit  to  taxpayers  in  the
equal to zero.  $14,000-$16,000  class  in  rural  areas, but  there  were
Although  the  state-wide  Index  would  be  relatively few people in this class (Table  3).
approximately  zero, urban  areas would  enjoy  a more
progressive  tax  structure than would  rural areas.  The  IMPLICATIONS  OF PROPERTY TAX
overall  Index  in urban areas would be .11  and in rural  DISPLACEMENT
areas  only  -.14.  We  can  examine  the distribution of
these benefits by  looking at the  trade-off  values, i.e.,  Results  presented  thus far examined the effect at
the  estimated  net benefit or cost to taxpayers in each  one  point  in  time of substituting state income  taxes
income  class. This examination shows that with an 80  for  property  taxes.  It  is  important  to  consider  how
percent  reduction  in  property  taxes  and  a  70.6  these  tax bases  change  over time. Davis reported that
percent  increase  in income  taxes  the largest  net  gain  the  income  elasticity  of  the  property  tax  base  for
was  $107.96  per  taxpayer  in  the  $0-2,000  income  Georgia  was  1.37  [1].  This  figure indicates  that for
Table 3.  DISTRIBUTION  OF  THE CHANGE  IN  TOTAL  TAX LIABILITY  PER TAXPAYER  RESULTING
FROM  80  PERCENT REDUCTION  IN  PROPERTY  TAXES  AND  70.6 PERCENT INCREASE  IN
INCOME TAXES,  GEORGIA,1971a
Adjusted  County  Population
Gross  Income  Less  Than  10,000  10,000  or  More  Average
---------------------------------  (dollars)----------------  -----  ---
0-2,000  -51.68  -107.96  -83.43
2,000-4,000  -55.33  -47.46  -51.11
4,000-6,000  -45.80  -49.16  -47.27
6,000-8,000  -32.27  -43.18  -38.98
8,000-10,000  -10.94  -41.90  -31.69
10,000-12,000  12.97  -21.99  -11.22
12,000-14,000  20.77  5.55  9.39
14,000-16,000  -13.96  5.67  1.11
16,000-18,000  67.48  58.31  60.83
Over  18,000  342.90  367.02  358.86
Average  -2.42  1.27  0.00
aA  negative  sign indicates  that tax liability  was reduced  by the policy  change  and would  result  in a
net benefit  to the taxpayer.
113each  1 percent  increase  in  income,  there  has been  a  regressiveness  of the  state's total tax structure  can be
1.37  percent  rise  in  the  property  tax  base.  The  improved  by  substituting  increased  state  or  local
income  elasticity of the property tax base was 1.68 in  income  tax  for  decreased  property  tax.  Increased
rural  counties  and  1.34 in  urban  counties, indicating  local  income  taxes  substituted  for  property  taxes
that  the  property  tax base  was  more  responsive  to  preserves  the  concept  of local  tax  levies  applied  for
income  in  rural  counties.  Although  population  local  uses.  If  increased  state  income  taxes  were
actually  declined  in  these  rural  counties  during  the  substituted  for  property  taxes,  provisions  should  be
1960-1970  decade,  per  capita  incomes  increased  at  a  made to distribute the increase back to the local area.
faster  rate  in  rural  than  in  urban  counties.  In  general,  trading  the  state or  local  income tax
Consequently,  total  income  increased  at  essentially  for  property  tax  shifts  the  tax  burden  from  those
the  same  rate  for  the  two  groups;  112  percent  in  earning  less  than  $12,000  adjusted  gross  income  to
urban  counties  and  116  percent  in rural  counties[5]  those  earning greater  amounts. Substituting  the sales
and  [6].  Placing  more emphasis on income in the tax  tax  for  property  tax  would  make  the  tax  burden
base  would  thus  have  a  similar  effect  in both urban  smaller  for those  earning  less than $4,000 of adjusted
and rural areas.  gross  income,  but  it  would  lighten  even  more  the
SUMMARY  AND CONCLUSIONS  burden of those earning greater than $14,000 adjusted
gross  income,  thereby  shifting  the  entire  burden  of The  sampling techniques and analysis used in this  increased  sales  taxes  to  those  in  middle  income increased  sales  taxes  to  those  in  middle  income
study  show  conclusively  that  the  property  tax  is  brackets.
regressive.  Furthermore,  there  is strong  evidence that
REFERENCES
[1]  Davis,  L.  Harlan.  Property Tax  Trends Affecting  Georgia Agriculture. University of Georgia  Agricultural
Experiment  Station Research Report No.  106, June  1971.
[2]  Herber,  Bernard  P. Modern  Public Finance, The Study of Public Sector Economics. Homewood,  Ill: Richard
D.  Irwin, Inc.,  1971.
[3]  Musgrave,  Richard A.  The Theory of Public Finance.  New York: McGraw-Hill  Book Co.,  1959.
[4]  Samuelson, Paul  A. Economics. New York:  McGraw-Hill Book Co.,  1973.
[5]  Smith,  Blair  J.,  and  David  W.  Parvin.  Employment  and Income  Characteristics  for  Georgia Counties
1940-1970. University of Georgia  Agricultural Experiment Station Research Report  No.  178,  Dec.  1973.
[6]  Tarver,  James  D., and John  W.  Nixon. Population Trends of Georgia Cities and Towns: A Half Century of
Population Growth.  University  of Georgia  Agricultural  Experiment  Station Research  Report  No.  145,
Oct.  1972.
[7]  U.S.  Dept.  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of the  Census.  1969-1970 Government Finances,  Govt.  Printing  Office,
Washington, D.C., 1970.
[8]  U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Internal  Revenue  Service, Washington,  D.C.
114